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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
MARCANTONIO V. MOEN: AN EXPERT'S AFFIDAVIT 
MATERIALLY CONTRADICTS A PRIOR SWORN 
STATEMENT ONLY WHEN THERE IS AN 
IRRECONCILABLE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACT. 
By: Joseph Maher 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an affidavit is a 
material contradiction of prior deposition testimony, under Maryland 
Rule 5-201(e), when it creates an irreconcilable factual discrepancy of 
consequence to the expert's previous sworn statement. Marcantonio v. 
Moen, 406 Md. 395, 959 A.2d 764 (2008). Upon finding a material 
contradiction, the court may strike the disingenuous affidavit. /d. at 
412, 959 A.2d at 774. 
In August 2000, Sherri Schaefer ("Schaefer") informed her 
gynecologist, Melissa Moen, M.D., ("Dr. Moen") that she was 
experiencing abnormal vaginal bleeding. The next month, Dr. Moen 
performed an ultrasound; however, she did not perform a biopsy at this 
time. Paula DeCandido, M.D., ("Dr. DeCandido") interpreted the 
ultrasound. Dr. DeCandido failed to report a 1.5 centimeter mass 
located on Schaefer's right ovary. Continuing to experience physical 
ailments, Schaefer returned to Dr. Moen and underwent a biopsy in 
April 2001. Schaefer was diagnosed with cancer and received 
treatment until her death on May 18, 2005. 
Prior to her death, Schaefer and her husband, Charles Marcantonio 
("Marcantonio"), filed a claim in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County against Drs. Moen and DeCandido ("Medical Providers") for 
negligently failing to diagnose and treat Schaefer's cancer in 2000. 
After Schaefer's death, Marcantonio added wrongful death and 
survivorship claims against the Medical Providers in an amended 
complaint. 
Two expert witnesses for Marcantonio were deposed. The first 
expert, Dr. Hutchins, testified that he reasonably believed that Dr. 
Moen departed from the applicable standard of care, but he would not 
render an opinion as to the cause of Schaefer's death. In a subsequent 
affidavit, Dr. Hutchins rendered an opinion, within a reasonable 
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degree of medical probability, that Dr. Moen's failure to diagnose 
Schaefer's condition in 2000 was the proximate cause of her death. 
Dr. Shmookler, Marcantonio's second expert, testified in his 
deposition that he did not have an opinion of the staging or prognosis 
of Schaefer's cancer, within a reasonable degree of medical 
probability, during May and July 2001. However, in a subsequent 
affidavit, Dr. Shmookler stated that the failure to properly diagnose the 
ovarian tumor in September 2000 was a substantial factor which 
proximately caused Schaefer's death. 
The Medical Providers filed a motion to strike the affidavits of Drs. 
Hutchins and Shmookler. The circuit court granted the motion on the 
basis that the affidavits materially contradicted the prior deposition 
testimony of the experts, in violation of Maryland Rule 2-501(e) 
("Rule 2-501(e)"). As a result, the circuit court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Medical Providers. On appeal by 
Marcantonio, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. 
Marcantonio petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, and the court granted the petition. 
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals of Maryland determined under 
what circumstances, pursuant to Rule 2-501(e), an affidavit materially 
contradicts an expert's prior deposition testimony. Marcantonio, 406 
Md. 405 n.8, 959 A.2d at 769 n.8. The Medical Providers argued that 
the plain language of Rule 2-501(e) requires its application to any 
contradiction found in an affidavit which conflicts with a prior sworn 
statement. I d. at 407-08, 959 A.2d at 771. In contrast, Marcantonio 
argued that Rule 2-501(e) only applies to contradictions of material 
fact between deposition testimony and an affidavit. ld. at 409, 959 
A.2d at 772. 
In a prior case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided that the 
sham affidavit rule did not mesh with Maryland law because it shifts 
the determination of credibility from the trier of fact to the judge on 
summary judgment. Id. at 407, 959 A.2d at 771 (citing Pittman v. At/. 
Realty, 359 Md. 513, 540-42, 754 A.2d 1030, 1041 (2000)). The sham 
affidavit rule, which has been adopted by every federal circuit, 
provides the trial court with discretion to disregard an affidavit that 
materially contradicts prior sworn testimony when afforded no 
explanation. Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 405, 959 A.2d at 770 (citing 
Pittman, 359 Md. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038). Subsequently, in 2003, 
the Rules Committee examined the issue of sham affidavits and 
recommended that a subsection be added to Rule 2-501. Marcantonio, 
406 Md. at 407, 959 A.2d at 771. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
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accepted the Rules Committee's recommendation to include 
subsection (e), which now reads in pertinent part, that "[i]f the court 
finds that an affidavit or other statement under oath materially 
contradicts the prior sworn statement, the court shall strike the 
contradictory part." !d. (citing Md. Rule 2-501(e)). 
The rule does not define "material contradiction" so the court 
examined the ordinary meaning of the words. Marcantonio, 406 Md. 
at 409, 959 A.2d at 772. The court explained that a "material 
contradiction," under Rule 5-201(e), occurs when a statement is 
"irreconcilable" to the affiant's prior sworn statement because a 
factual assertion is "significantly opposite." !d. at 410, 959 A.2d at 
773. The court provided an example involving an individual's 
exposure to lead paint where the deposition provided a specific time 
period; however, the later affidavit set forth a different length of time. 
!d. at 406, 410, 959 A.2d at 770-71, 773 (citing Pittman, 359 Md. at 
518, 523-26, 754 A.2d at 1032, 1035-37). There was a clear material 
contradiction of the amount of time because both statements could not 
be true; therefore, the court may properly strike an affidavit under such 
a circumstance. Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 410, 959 A.2d at 773. 
In comparison, the court looked to the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals for an example of what is not considered a material 
contradiction. !d. at 411, 959 A.2d at 773 (citing Hinch v. Lucy Webb 
Hayes Nat. Training, 814 A.2d 926 (D.C. 2003)). In that case, the 
initial deposition stated that the expert could not "tease apart" the 
exact cause of the plaintiffs injury from the several possible causes; 
however, the affidavit stated, to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiffs 
injuries. Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 411, 959 A.2d at 773 (citing Hinch, 
814 A.2d at 931 ). The court held that this did not constitute a "clear 
and explicit contradiction." Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 411, 959 A.2d at 
773-74 (citing Hinch, 814 A.2d at 931). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland continued to cement its 
definition of a material contradiction through rulings of other 
jurisdictions and the purpose of the Maryland summary judgment 
procedure. Marcantonio, 406 Md. at 411-12, 959 A.2d at 774. Upon 
this justified definition, the court held that the affidavits of Drs. 
Hutchins and Shmookler did not materially contradict their prior 
deposition testimonies. !d. at 413-14, 959 A.2d at 775. Dr. Hutchins' 
affidavit was viewed to supplement his deposition, demonstrating a 
change in intention and not a factual contraction. !d. at 413, 959 A.2d 
at 774-75. Dr. Shmookler's affidavit was deemed to be, at best, a 
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credibility issue and not an issue of fact. !d. at 414, 959 A.2d at 775. 
The absence of an opinion as to Schaefer's prognosis or staging did 
not prohibit Dr. Shmookler from making an opinion pertaining to the 
failure of the treating physician's diagnosis of the tumor. !d. 
While the court clearly elucidates the definition of a "material 
contradiction" under Maryland Rule 2-50l(e), the court's 
interpretation in this matter greatly affects the current practitioner in 
his approach to depositions and summary judgment proceedings. This 
ruling allows an expert to give vague and indirect answers in the early 
stages of a lawsuit to avoid claims of summary judgment. Although 
this approach to the discovery process may in some ways affect 
judicial economy, it promotes justice by focusing summary judgment 
only on material facts, not on the existence of mere contradiction or 
witness credibility. 
